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I. INTRODUCTION
January 1, 1970 marks the unofficial start of the
Environmental Age. The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) became effective at 12:01 AM on January 1.1 The Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) came into being in 1970 while the
inaugural Earth Day was April 22, 1970.2 The paradigm switched
from resource exploitation to resource conservation. Several
environmental protection statutes were enacted at this time.3
America’s economy for roughly a decade and a half, from the
onset of the Great Depression in 1929 through the end of World
War II in 1945, stagnated. Economic expansion was stalled,
unemployment soared, and consumer expenditures depressed.
Peace unleashed a period of sustained economic growth and
development. Pent-up demand was released like a pressure
cooker. The United States emerged from the war, unlike the rest
of the world, with a vibrant, undamaged industrial base, which
could switch to consumer goods from war production.
Detroit built large, popular, gas-guzzling cars as conspicuous
consumption became the norm. Consumers purchased homes,
cars, and appliances.4 Higher education ballooned. Downtowns
boomed. A college degree was almost a guarantee of meaningful
employment. America built up its infrastructure: airports,
highways, bridges, dams and channels, power plants,
transmission lines, and pipelines. Congress enacted the National
Interstate and Defense Highways Act of 1956.5 A frenzy ensued
to build the roughly 41,000 miles of the interstate highway
system; the creation of the nation’s highways fueled the move to
the booming suburbs. The dawn of the environmental era marked
the end of highway building, especially through cities.
Progress was the credo. A country which could place a man
on the moon was seemingly capable of anything, but apparently
not protecting the environment. Emphasis was on the quantity of

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852.
Environmental
History
Timeline,
ENV’T
HIST.
TIMELINE,
http://environmentalhistory.org/20th-century/seventies-1970-79/ [http://perma.cc/W8WN3EXM] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
3 Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENV’T L.J. 75, 77–79 (2001).
4 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in
Postwar America, 31 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 236, 237.
5 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, Ch. 462, 70 Stat. 374 (codified as amended in
scattered statutes in 23 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.).
1
2
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life–not the quality of life.
The preceding seven decades represented the Conservation
Era. The theme of the century old City Beautiful6 and Conservation
Movements continued into the earlier 1960s with enactment of the
National Historic Preservation Act,7 Wilderness Act,8 and the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act,9 all conservation measures.
The ethos of the Conservation Era was to preserve and
conserve that which was there. The ethos of the Environmental
Era is to both conserve and preserve, but more significantly to
clean up, bring back, and restore.
The environment was lost in the quest for economic
expansion. Four events alerted the public to the degradation of
the environment. The first was Rachel Carson’s epic Silent
Spring,10 published in 1962, focusing national attention on the
risks of toxic chemicals. The second was the Santa Barbara Oil
Blowout of January 28, 1969.11 The national coverage coupled
with photos of oil covered sea birds was riveting.12 The third was
the growing smog problem, especially in Los Angeles.13 Finally
was the Cuyahoga River catching on fire as it flowed through
Cleveland on June 22, 1969.14

6 The City Beautiful Movement championed building parks, including pocket parks,
in the nation’s cities and other forms of beautifying the cities of the day. See WILLIAM
WYCKOFF, HOW TO READ THE AMERICAN WEST 296–97 (2014). Frederick Law Olmstead
designed many of the great gardens and open spaces of modern America. See JUSTIN
MARTIN, GENIUS OF PLACE: THE LIFE OF FREDERICK LAW OLMSTEAD 1–2 (2011).
7 Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§
470x–470x-6; renumbered as scattered statutes in 54 U.S.C.).
8 Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136).
9 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968)
(providing for a National Wild and Scenic Rivers System) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287).
10 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). The impact of Rachel Carson is the focus
of American Experience: Rachel Carson (PBS television broadcast Jan. 24, 2017).
11 See Harry Trimborn, Battle Shaping Up Over Offshore Oil, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1969, at A1.
12 The Santa Barbara Oil Blowout was a seminal moment in American
environmental law. It led to enactment of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1666), and the Ports
and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1221–1236). Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) was the only
major case arising out of the blowout. It opened up civil liability in oil spill cases.
13 See Gene Sherman, Where We Stand on Smog Problem, What’s Been Done, What’s
Ahead, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1961, at C1. I. I remember flying through Los Angeles
International Airport around two o’clock in the afternoon in the mid-1970’s and seeing
what appeared to be a beautiful sunset. The orange glow was, of course, smog.
14 See The Cities: The Price of Optimism, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 41. Check out Randy
Newman’s classic “Burn On.” RANDY NEWMAN, Burn On, on Sail Away (Reprise Records
1972).
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The vast majority of public environmental law is
administrative law.15 Consequently, many of the landmark
environmental cases involve administrative law issues. The
threshold issues at the onset of the Environmental Era were
standing, reviewability, and agency discretion—beginning with
standing for access to the courts. The presumption was that the
administrative agencies were charged with protecting and
promoting the public interest so that their decisions should not
be questioned by the public they were sworn to protect.
This Article analyzes the cases that form the foundation of modern
American environmental law and protection. Professors J. B. Ruhl and
Jim Salzman provide a valuable study of environmental law cases by
surveying environmental professionals in 2001, 2009, and 2019 to select
the top ten environmental cases. They found four constant cases in the
top ten,16 while two others appear in the newer surveys.17
My approach is more subjective. It is based on five decades in
environmental law looking at environmental protection from a
historical perspective of the environmental, procedural, and
substantive impacts and significance of the decisions. These
cases are selected either for their legal significance or
contributions to environmental improvement. Other professors
and professionals could easily choose different cases because
scores of significant environmental cases have been decided.18
II. THE PRECURSOR CASES
The Environmental Era did not suddenly pop up. Three
infrastructure cases developing in the late 1960s continuing into
the 1970s provided strong signals that the times “were a
changing.”19

Private compensatory remedies are usually taught in a Toxic Torts course.
J. B. Ruhl & Jim Salzman, American Idols, ENV’T F., May–June 2019, at 40. The
four perennial cases are Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972), and Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Id. at
43. Professor Lazarus has also written on the history of environmental law. RICHARD J.
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).
17 Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 16, at 43. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
18 I have not included any of the myriad of wetlands cases because no clear
constitutional standards have yet arisen.
19 Cf. BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are-a-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE-ACHANGIN’ (Columbia Records 1964).
15
16
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A. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission20
The East Coast suffered a massive electrical blackout on
November 9, 1965. It was a cascading power failure up and down the
East Coast and Ontario. The Great Northeast Blackout of 1965
resulted in over thirty million people losing power. The proposed
solution was to have standby electrical sources that could
immediately power up. One way to accomplish that goal was the
construction of pumped storage facilities. Water would be pumped up
to a hilltop reservoir during slack times, such as nighttime. It would
then flow down during peak or emergency times.21 A 1,168-megawatt
pumped storage facility was erected at Northfield Mountain in
Massachusetts. A second one was planned in 1962 for Storm King
Mountain on the Hudson River fifty miles north of New York City.
Storm King was announced three years before the Blackout, but the
promoters used the Blackout to justify the plant’s construction. The
intake and outflow sites were planned in the prime spawning
grounds of the Atlantic striped bass.
The Federal Power Commission (FPC) issued a permit for
the facility. The Second Circuit overturned the license for failure
to consider alternatives, such as interconnects, gas turbines,
nuclear power, underground transmission lines, or a combination
of them.22 It criticized the agency for acting as an “umpire
blandly calling balls and strikes” rather than affirmatively
protecting the public interest.23 The right of the public “must
receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the
Commission.”24 The D.C. Circuit recognized that standing can be
based on “aesthetic, conservational, and recreational” injuries.25
The FPC’s decision on remand said:
Just as the mountain has swallowed the scar of the highway, the
intrusive railroad structure and fills, and tolerates both the barges
and scows which pass by it and the thoughtless humans who visit it
without seeing it, so it will swallow the structures which will serve the
needs of people for electric power.26

Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
Pumped storage facilities are technically energy inefficient since pumped storage
requires about two kilowatt hours of electricity in exchange for one kilowatt hour
generated in the discharge. The value is in the timing.
22 Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 621–23.
23 Id. at 620.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 616. The court also extended standing to those whose activities and conduct
show a “special interest” in the area. Id.
26 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 44 F.P.C. 350, 384 (1970), aff’d sub nom. Scenic
20
21
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The FPC’s Chairman Nassikas stated “I’m a conservationist
too,” but recognized the agency’s first mission is to encourage “an
abundant supply of electric energy throughout the United States.”27
Extensive agency proceedings and litigation ensued. The
proposal was dropped in 1980. The pump storage facility was
never built.28 Ironically, the Storm King Mountain proposal was
announced on September 27, 1962—the same day Rachel
Carson’s Silent Spring was published.29
A subsequent casualty of the Storm King litigation was the
Westway Highway project. A section of Manhattan’s Westside
Highway collapsed. The proposal was to replace it by filling in
242 acres, of which 31 acres would be for interchange ramps, 110
acres for new development, and 93 for a recreational park. Half
the new road would be underground. Westway was enjoined
because of the failure to deal with the striped bass issue.30
B.

The Cross Florida Barge Canal31
The Cross Florida Barge Canal, like the Ford Edsel, seemed
a good idea at the time. The dream of a canal linking the Gulf
Coast to the Atlantic harkens back to the early days of the
Spanish exploration of Florida. The onset of World War II
accelerated the apparent need for the Canal.32 Congress
authorized it in 1942. The Canal would cut through north central
Florida from Jacksonville to the Gulf of Mexico—bifurcating the
state. Construction began in 1964. Decisions remained to be
made when NEPA came into effect on January 1, 1970. The canal
was roughly “one-third complete and approximately $74 million

Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971). Simon &
Garfunkel’s The Sound of Silence “people hearing without listening” characterized the
FPC decision. See SIMON & GARFUNKEL, The Sound of Silence, on WEDNESDAY MORNING,
3AM (Columbia Records 1964).
27 Edward Cowan, Power: To Use Or Not To Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1972, at F12.
28 The Storm King saga is the basis of ROBERT D. LIFSET, POWER ON THE HUDSON:
STORM KING MOUNTAIN AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM
(2014).
29 Id. at 5–6.
30 See Action for Rational Transit v. W. Side Highway Project, 536 F. Supp. 1225
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
31 For a detailed history of the Cross Florida Canal, see STEVEN NOLL & DAVID
TEGEDER, DITCH OF DREAMS: THE CROSS FLORIDA BARGE CANAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
FLORIDA’S FUTURE (2009).
32 German U-Boats were torpedoing ships off the Florida coast after the United
States entered World War II. See Ed Offley, Germany Brought WWII to the Florida Coast
in
1942,
LEDGER
(June
23,
2019,
7:15
PM)
http://www.theledger.com/news/20190623/germany-brought-wwii-to-florida-coast-in-1942
[http://perma.cc/PAD4-MXVL].
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had been spent on land acquisition and construction”33 when a
court issued an injunction. The project’s Rodman Dam was
completed in 1968 on the Ocklawaha River. Thirteen thousand
acres of partially cleared land in the Ocklawaha Valley were
flooded. A total of 1,135 acres of large hardwood trees were left
standing prior to the flooding to serve as fish habitat. The
flooding was now progressively killing the trees.
The court followed the standard requirements for
preliminary injunctive relief:
(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the
merits, (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that the
threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the
injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the
preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.34

The background to the opinion is the understanding that
President Nixon was going to scuttle the canal, which he did
three days later on January 19, 1971.35
The court did not address an interesting issue in its short
opinion. Preliminary relief is supposed to preserve the status quo
pending the final trial on the merits.36 The question is what is
the status quo? Partially flooded trees? Draining the lake to
preserve the trees? We know the answer; Rodman Dam still
stands with the lake behind it.
Opposition to the canal was led by Marjorie Harris Carr. The
cessation of construction left the state with a right of way up to a
mile wide along the canal right of way. The path is named the
Marjorie Harris Carr Cross Florida Greenway.

33 GEOCACHING,
Marjorie
Harris
Carr
Cross
Florida
Greenway
https://www.geocaching.com/geocache/GCN147_marjorie-harris-carr-cross-floridagreenway?guid=00b941a3-0676-40e4-9f75-0432db7a08c6
[http://perma.cc/5SCX-EM46]
(last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
34 Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 570, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).
35 Stop
Order
from
President
Richard
Nixon,
FLA.
MEMORY,
http://www.floridamemory.com/onlineclassroom/primarysourcesets/water/documents/nixo
n/ [http://perma.cc/AKY8-V62G]. The canal was formally deauthorized in 1990. Cross
Florida Barge Canal, 16 U.S.C. § 460tt (2020).
36 Callaway, 489 F.2d at 576.
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III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE FOUNDATIONS
A.

Reviewability: Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe37
The third case involved both a freeway siting through an urban
park and the reviewability of agency action. Sierra Club v. Morton
decided the fundamental issue of standing to get into federal
court.38 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe lays out the
parameters for deciding the standards for reviewing administrative
decisions once in court.39
The proposal was to build a six-lane highway through
downtown Memphis slicing through Memphis’ Overton Park.40
The highway would sever the zoo from the park and destroy 26
acres of the 342 acre park.41 The proposed extension of I-40 would
cut directly through Memphis instead of rerouting drivers around
the existing bypass.42 The Federal Highway Administration
(FHA) approved the route in 1966.43
No formal findings of fact accompanied the approval.44
Congress enacted the Federal Transportation Act—section 4(f)
prohibited the construction through parkland unless no “feasible
and prudent” alternative existed, and even then, only if all
possible methods for reducing harm to the park were taken.45
The plaintiffs alleged a violation of section 4(f) and the
failure to provide formal findings.46 The agency claimed it had
discretion to approve the project.47
The Supreme Court held an agency’s discretion should be
measured within the context of the relevant statutes.48 The
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) normally applies in laying
out the standards of review.49 A presumption of reviewability
exists under the APA.50 An agency’s discretion is unreviewable
only if “there is a statutory prohibition on review or where

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 406–07 (1971).
See 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
401 U.S. 402, 406–07 (1971).
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.
23 U.S.C. § 138 (2020).
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 408–09.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id.
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‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’”51 The
Supreme Court held this exception applies only when “statutes
are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply.”52
Section 4(f) provides specific restrictions on the FHA’s
discretion.53 Therefore, there is law to be applied. The FHA failed
to meet the 4(f) standards.54
The Court also explained the various standards of review.
For example, the substantial evidence test applies when the
agency action is undertaken pursuant to a rulemaking provision
of the APA or when the agency action is based on a public
adjudicatory hearing.55 An agency decision should be set aside if
the action is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law or if the action failed to
meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements.”56
The Court agreed no formal findings of fact were required, 57
but the Administrator had to provide justifications for the
decision. Post hoc rationalizations should be critically reviewed. 58
The FHA subsequently amended its regulations to require formal
findings of fact.
Overton Park had two major consequences. First, the Court
substantially reined in agency’s “unreviewable” discretion. Second,
the practical result of Storm King Mountain, The Cross Florida
Barge Canal, and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park is that
infrastructure is no longer sacrosanct. The environmental laws apply
to infrastructure projects. These cases also represented the change in
paradigms from the “master builder”59 to the environmentalist.

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 410 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701).
Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)).
53 Id. at 411.
54 Id. at 411–12.
55 Id. at 414.
56 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
57 Id. at 409.
58 Id. at 420. Post hoc rationalizations have traditionally been viewed as an
“inadequate basis for review.” Id. at 419.
59 Robert Moses is the penultimate master builder/master planner. He was in charge of
planning and public works in both the city and state of New York. His legacy includes 13
bridges, 416 miles of parkways, 28,000 housing units, and 658 playgrounds in New York
City. He turned tenements into public housing. His legacy includes the Triborough Bridge,
Verrazano Narrows Bridge, Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, Throgs Neck Bridge, BrooklynQueens Expressway, Cross Bronx Expressway, Cross Bronx Expressway, Westside
Highway, Van Wyck Expressway, Henry Hudson Parkway, Jones Beach, Lincoln Center,
United Nations Headquarters, and Shea Stadium. See generally ROBERT A. CARO, THE
POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK (1974). Robert Moses was
blocked when he tried to build the Lower Manhattan highway through Greenwich Village.
51
52

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/17/2021 8:08 AM

The Pillars of Modern American Environmental Law

11

B.

Standng: Sierra Club v. Morton60
A threshold standard of federal jurisdiction is that the
plaintiff must have an injury, a sufficient stake in a justiciable
controversy; in essence, to have suffered an injury recognized by
federal law. Section 10 of the APA provides: “A person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”61 An understanding
existed prior to the environmental cases that standing entailed
an economic injury. Professor Stone asked the question: “Should
Trees Have Standing?”62
The Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton63 opened up the
doors to non-economic standing. The Sierra Club opposed
development of a Disney ski resort in Mineral King National
Forest nestled in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. It claimed
standing in a representative capacity “in the conservation and
the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and
forests of the country . . . . One of the principal purposes of the
Sierra Club is to protect and conserve the national resources of
the Sierra Nevada Mountains.”64 It therefore sought standing
based on an interest in the problem without a particularized
injury in fact.65
The Court rejected this broad definition of injury for
standing. However, the Court promulgated three critical holdings
that opened up standing. First, the Court extended standing to
aesthetic and environmental well-being.66 The Court cited an
earlier opinion, Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,67 which stated an injured interest
may reflect “‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ as well

See generally 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2020).
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing: Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CALIF. L. REV. 450, 450 (1972).
63 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. 727. Walt Disney supervised the pageantry at the 1960
Squaw Valley Winter Olympics in the Sierras, and decided he loved ski resorts. The
Disney plan for the Mineral King Valley in Sequoia National Forest called for a $35
million complex of motels, restaurants, swimming pools, parking lots, and other
structures to accommodate up to 14,000 visitors. Ironically, development of the area was
originally supported by the Sierra Club.
64 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734 n.8.
65 The Sierra Club pushed the case as a test case, pushing the boundaries of
standing. It could have amended its case to show particularized standing, as it quickly did
after the Supreme Court decision.
66 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734.
67 See generally 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
60
61
62
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as economic values.”68 Thus an economic injury was no longer a
prerequisite for standing.
Second, standing can be extended to organizations in a
representational capacity if an individual member satisfies the
standing requirements.69 Thus an environmental organization,
NGO, or trade association can act on behalf of its members.70 The
practical significance is that these organizations often have the
resources which individuals lack to litigate these problems.
Third, once standing is obtained, the claimant can assert the
broader public interest and is not limited to the issue asserted for
standing.71 The successful claimant thereby assumes the role of a
private attorney general.72
The answer to Professor Stone’s question and Justice
Douglas’ concurring opinion is “Trees technically do not have
standing.” However, we know from other cases that inanimate
objects can be named a plaintiff as long as a named individual
or organization has standing. Only one plaintiff need have
standing. Standing may be pushed or stretched after Sierra
Club v. Morton,73 but the core remains.
The case helped fuel the growth of environmental and public
interest organizations on both sides.74 The Sierra Club effectively
won the case on standing, and the underlying environmental
dispute. Representative Phil Burton (D. Ca.) crafted a “park
barrel” bill modeled after the traditional park barrel legislation
with government projects for members of Congress.75
Id. at 154.
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739.
Id.
71 Id. at 737.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency Procs. (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 687–88 (1973). An individual may have standing even if large numbers are
similarly affected.
74 The Environmental Defense Fund was established earlier in 1965 and was soon
followed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Earth Justice Foundation
(formerly the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund), the Conservation Law Foundation, and
the Conservation Law Foundation of New England. The Sierra Club blossomed. Other
established environmental organizations such as the National Audubon Society, the
Wilderness Society, World Wildlife Federation, and the Izaak Walton League grew in
membership. Defenders of Wildlife quickly emerged, while Greenpeace has been the most
active internationally. The Nature Conservancy and Save the Redwoods League
continued their policies of acquiring environmentally critical lands. Friends of the Earth
sprang off from the Sierra Club. The National Parks Association renamed itself the
National Parks Conservation Association. On the opposite side of the spectrum are
organizations such as the Pacific Legal Foundation and the Mountain States Legal
Foundation.
75 See Harold Gilliam, Remembering Edgar Wayburn, SIERRA (July–Aug. 2010),
68
69
70
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Representative Burton invited Representatives to submit
proposed additions to national parks, forests, marine sanctuaries,
refuges, monuments, and seashores in their district.76 He
packaged them together in the Omnibus Parks Bill, signed by
President Carter on November 10, 1978.77 The Act transferred
Mineral King to the National Park Service with a proviso
banning downhill skiing in the area.78
The Johnson Administration in 1967 stripped the Sierra
Club of its tax exemption because of its campaign against two
proposed dams that would partly flood the Grand Canyon.79 The
tag line in the New York Times and Washington Post was “Should
we also flood the Sistine Chapel so tourists can float nearer the
ceiling?”80 The IRS action ironically boosted the Club by turning
it into an environmental martyr, rather than crushing it.81
C. Standing and Climate Change: Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency82
The Supreme Court in a 1907 interstate pollution case held a
state “in its capacity of quasi-sovereign” could sue for damages or
abatement for interstate pollution.83
A century after Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and forty-five
years after Sierra Club v. Morton, the Court issued two significant
holdings in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency.84
First, it extended standing to Massachusetts, which has special
standing as a state because of its “quasi-sovereign” status.85
The second holding has great importance in the current
battle over climate change.86 The Court held the EPA has
jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act to regulate carbon dioxide
http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/201007/wayburn.aspx
[http://perma.cc/2987-UF9J]
(discussing the “park barrel” bills).
76 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON NAT’L PARKS & INSULAR AFFS. OF THE H. COMM. ON
INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFS., 95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL PARKS
AND RECREATION ACT OF 1978 (1978) [http://perma.cc/JN2A-7YTB].
77 National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, § 314, 92 Stat.
3467.
78 Id.
79 See Bob Turner, Sacrifice of a Natural Wonder America's Most Regretted
Environmental Mistake, TEHIPITE TOPICS, Winter 2017, at 11 [http://perma.cc/7TWYSWSS].
80 Id.
81 The Sierra Club to this day eschews non-profit status.
82 See generally 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
83 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236–37 (1907).
84 See 549 U.S. 497.
85 See id. at 520.
86 See id. at 525.
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and other greenhouse gasses from auto exhausts and thus
stationary sources, which include power plants, if found to
endanger public health.87 EPA thereby has the authority to
impose substantial controls on greenhouse gas emissions from
fixed sources—a major cause of global warming.
D. The Chevron Doctrine: Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council88
Congress enacts statutes and creates agencies to implement
the statutes.89 The powers delegated to regulatory agencies are
often extensive and the statutes vague.90 Agencies thereby have
to construe and apply the statutes through regulations and
enforcement.91 Courts have traditionally deferred to the expertise
of the agencies in interpreting the statute.92 A maxim of
administrative law since the New Deal is that courts will defer to
the discretion of administrative agencies, which possess the
expertise which courts lack in the specific areas.93
Congress required permits for point sources of air pollution,
but did not define point sources.94 The narrow issue was whether
a source could be viewed as a facility in its entirety or by
individual components within the plant.95 The agency’s initial
definition included any significant change or addition to a plant
or facility, viewed as a single “bubble.”96 The definition was
changed in 1981 with a new administration to a plant or factory
in its entirety, such that if reductions elsewhere in the source
resulted in no overall increase in emissions, then the polluter
could avoid a “new-source” review.97
Chevron reformulated the doctrine with what is known as
Chevron Deference.98 First, the court should look to the intent of
Congress: “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”99 The starting

87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

See id. at 528.
See generally 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See id. at 843, 845.
See id. at 843.
See id. at 843–44.
See id. at 843.
See id.
See id. at 850–51.
See id. at 851.
Id.
See id. at 853.
See generally id.
Id. at 842–44 (finding that the agency’s interpretation does not have to be the only
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point should be the plain words of the statute.100
On the other hand, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”101 Congress delegated authority to the agencies to fill gaps
in the specific provisions of a statute.102 A court is not to substitute
its own construction of the statute for that of the agency.103
The Chevron holding became known as the Chevron
two-step.104 The first step is to determine if Congress “has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”105 Then, the next
step is to determine whether the agency made a permissible
interpretation of the statute.106 Agencies routinely argue Chevron
protects their decisions even as to the extent of their jurisdiction,
and usually succeed.
The Chevron Doctrine has become controversial in recent
years as agencies stretch to justify their decisions.107 They
basically argue pursuant to Chevron that courts cannot
second-guess their decisions—essentially going back to the years
of non-reviewability before Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe.108
IV. NEPA
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), with its
requirement of environmental impact statements on any major
federal project significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, is one of America’s greatest contributions to the
global environment.109 Vermont Yankee is not the first Supreme
Court NEPA decision.110 The Supreme Court’s earlier decision in

interpretation, but a reasonable construction).
100 See id.
101 Id. at 843.
102 See id. at 843–44.
103 See id. at 844.
104 See Valerie C. Brannon & Jared P. Cole, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44954, CHEVRON
DEFERENCE: A PRIMER, at 1–2 (2002).
105 Id. at 842.
106 See id. at 843–44. For a humorous look at the Chevron two-step by law students at
NYU, see also Lewie Briggs, The Chevron Two Step, YOUTUBE (May 4, 2014),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHKujqyktJc [http://perma.cc/6UT5-9ZJS].
107 See, e.g., Eric Citron, The Roots and Limits of Gorsuch’s Views on Chevron
Deference,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar.
17,
2017,
11:26
AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/roots-limits-gorsuchs-views-chevron-deference/
[http://perma.cc/9SJD-UKDH].
108 See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837; see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. 402.
109 The other is the creation of national parks.
110 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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Kleppe v. Sierra Club111 held:
1) An EIS is not required until an agency has issued a
report or recommendation on a major federal action;
2) The court’s role is to ensure the agency took “a hard
look” at the environmental consequences of a proposal, but
not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the
environmental consequences of the proposal; and
3) The only procedural requirements are those set forth
in the plain words of the statute.112
Vermont Yankee113 is a NEPA case involving two appeals by
intervenors contesting the issuance of permits for the
construction of nuclear power plants.114 The Vermont Yankee
half of the case involved the handling of nuclear waste.115 The
intervenors asserted that section 4 of the Administrative
Procedure Act “merely establishes lower procedural bounds and
that a court may routinely require more than the minimum when
an agency’s proposed rule addresses complex or technical factual
issues or ‘Issues of Great Public Import.’”116
The NRC’s staff prepared a conclusory table to reflect the
insignificant environmental effects of the fuel cycle.117 The crux
of the agency’s substantive decision is that “the environmental
effects of the uranium fuel cycle have been shown to be relatively
insignificant . . . .”118 The agency at the public hearing treated Dr.
Frank Pittman, presenting the report, with great deference,
whereas the intervenors were treated with open hostility.119
The D.C. Court of Appeals ordered the Atomic Energy
Commission to adopt procedures for the intervenors.120 The agency
decided neither discovery nor cross examination would be

See 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
Id. at 410 n.21 (citing Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 453 F.2d
463, 481 (2d Cir. 1971) and Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).
113 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978).
114 Id.
115 See id. at 538–39 (stating that the plan would produce over 100 pounds annually
of radioactive waste, some of which would have to be isolated for 600 to hundreds of
thousands of years).
116 Id. at 545.
117 See id. at 530.
118 Id. at 545.
119 See generally id.
120 See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 652–54
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (refraining from specifically requiring cross examination but implying it
in the decision).
111
112
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allowed.121 Documents were made available to the intervenors, who
would be given a reasonable time to present their arguments.122
The D.C. Court of Appeals was upset at the disparate treatment
shown its staff versus the intervenors.123 The court felt the agency’s
procedures were inadequate and ordered the case remanded,
although it did not specify the procedures to be used on remand.124
The intervenors’ premise was that “the problems involved
are not merely technical, but involve basic philosophical issues
concerning man’s ability to make commitments which will
require stable social structures for unprecedented periods.”125
Judge Bazelon in his concurring opinion wrote:
Decisions in areas touching the environment or medicine affect the
lives and health of all. These interests, like the First Amendment,
have ‘always had a special claim to judicial protection.’ Consequently,
more precision may be required than the less rigorous development of
scientific facts which may attend notice and comment procedures.126

The Court reaffirmed the Administrative Procedures Act: “Absent
constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances” the
agencies are free to determine their own rules of procedure.127 The
Administrative Procedures Act sets the maximum procedural
requirements.128 Courts are not free to add to them.129 Agencies can
fashion their own rules of procedure but cannot be mandated by courts
to do so.130
The Court therefore reaffirmed NEPA is a procedural statute, an
environmental full disclosure statute.131 The only procedural
requirements of NEPA are those within the statute.132 The agency’s
duty is to take a hard look at the environmental consequences.133 The
role of the court is not to second guess the agency’s decision on the
merits.134

Id. at 643.
See id.
123 Id. at 652–53.
124 See id. at 653–54.
125 Id. at 652.
126 Id. at 657.
127 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
543 (1978).
128 See id. at 524.
129 See id.
130 See id. at 543–45.
131 See id. at 558.
132 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 405–06 (1976).
133 See id. at 410 n.21.
134 See id. at 407.
121
122
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The federal government still has not developed a site for
disposal of high-level nuclear waste generated by commercial
nuclear power plants.
The other case, Consumers Power, involved the extent to
which the AEC had to consider energy conservation in its impact
statements.135 The NRC’s Licensing Board rejected energy
conservation as beyond their “province.”136 The agency viewed
energy conservation as a novel concept and thus shifted the
burden to the intervenors to present “clear and reasonably
specific energy conservation contentions.”137 The Court of
Appeals held the NRC had to undertake a “preliminary
investigation of the proffered alterative sufficient to reach a
rational judgment” in deciding whether to further pursue it.138
The Commission’s role is not to act like an umpire calling balls
and strikes.139
The Supreme Court reversed, cautioning “[c]ommon sense
also teaches us that the ‘detailed statement of alternatives’
cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to
include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the
mind of man.”140 The Court further held the “concept of
alternatives must be bounded by some notion of feasibility” to
avoid making the impact statement “an exercise in frivolous
boilerplate.”141 The role of the courts is not to second guess or
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.142
A long-standing split existed between the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court on judicial review of nuclear
energy.143 The Court cautioned the lower courts that the desirability
of nuclear energy is a legislative matter and not judicial:
Nuclear energy may some day be a cheap, safe source of power or it
may not. But Congress has made a choice to at least try nuclear
energy, establishing a reasonable review process in which courts are
to play only a limited role. . . . Time may prove wrong the decision to
develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the States within their
appropriate agencies which must eventually make that judgement.144

See Aeschliman v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Id. at 625.
137 Id. at 626.
138 Id. at 628.
139 Id. at 627.
140 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978).
141 Id.
142 See id. at 555.
143 See generally Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390; see also Vermont Yankee, 435
U.S. 519.
144 Id. at 557–58.
135
136
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The D.C. Circuit again overturned the NRC decision on
remand because it felt the agency had not considered the
long-term consequences of storing and handling the nuclear
wastes.145 The Supreme Court again reversed the court of
appeals, reemphasizing that NEPA is a procedural statute. 146
The court’s role is “simply to ensure that the agency has
adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of
its actions.”147 The standard of review is “arbitrary or
capricious.”148
NEPA is one of America’s great creations in environmental
protection.149 States and foreign countries have adopted their
own versions of NEPA. NEPA, within the Supreme Court’s
constraints, plays a major role in informing the public on the
environmental effects of federal action. It also serves as a method
for opponents of a project to litigate and stall action on the
adequacy of impact statements.150
A major problem with NEPA is that it has become a tool of
delay by project opponents.151 They seek relief contending a
NEPA statement should have been prepared or, if prepared, is
insufficient. Legal proceedings, and thus delay, ensues.
V. THE LIMITS OF TECHNOLOGY
Dupont’s slogan for several decades was “Better Living
Through Chemistry.” Benjamin Braddock whispered in the
Graduate: “One word: Plastics.”152 Faith in science and
technology permeated society into the 1960s. Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring triggered a reexamination of the faith in
technology. DDT, leaded gas, and Reserve Mining paved the way
for government regulation of toxic risk. The problem is that
regulatory agencies have to engage in risk analysis with
incomplete knowledge of the risks, especially long-term risks.
Judges and juries have to decide cases when the toxic risks are

145 See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 685 F.2d 459,
477–80 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
146 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97–98 (1983).
147 Id. at 106–08.
148 Id. at 98.
149 The other is the creation of national parks with the creation of Yosemite National
Park in 1872. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, § 1, 17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 21–40c).
150 See generally Denis Binder, Cutting the Nimbian Knot: A Primer, 40 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1009 (1991).
151 See generally id. at 1009.
152 The
Graduate
One
Word
Plastics,
YOUTUBE
(Sept.
30,
2015),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eaCHH5D74Fs.
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not fully known or often unknown.
The D.C. Circuit in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. Hodgson153 recognized:
[S]ome of the questions involved in the promulgation of these
standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and
consequently as to them insufficient data is presently available to
make a fully informed factual determination. Decision making must in
that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judgments
and less upon purely factual analysis. Thus, in addition to currently
unresolved factual issues, the formulation of standards involves
choices that by their nature require basic policy determinations rather
than resolution of factual controversies. Judicial review of inherently
legislative decisions of this sort is obviously an undertaking of
different dimensions.154

Professor Rodgers in reviewing the disparate opinions in
Industrial Union Dep’t. v. American Petroleum Inst.155 wrote the
disagreements may reflect “the fact that we live in a time when
values are in disarray. Institutions caught in the flux of
technological and social change are in for a rough ride until and
unless new grounds for consensus emerge.”156
A.

Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (“DDT”)
DDT was the miracle pesticide coming out of World War II. The
chemical, first synthesized in 1874, seemed the answer to many
problems. It killed the insects which spread malaria, typhus, and
dengue fever.157 It was used to delouse the returning soldiers at the
end of the war.158 DDT was then widely applied to civilian uses
after the war, such as controlling boll weevils in the South.159
DDT is not known to be toxic to humans but is listed as a
suspected carcinogen.160 The soil half-life ranges from twenty-two

499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Id. at 474–75.
155 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
156 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision
Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENV’T L. 301, 302 (1981).
157 DDT
Regulatory
History:
A
Brief
Survey
(to
1975),
EPA,
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/ddt-regulatory-history-brief-survey-1975.html
[http://perma.cc/MB5B-RK33] (Sept. 14, 2016).
158 The US Army Used DDT to De-louse Soldiers, APPALACHIAN HIST. (July 27, 2018),
https://www.appalachianhistory.net/2018/07/army-used-ddt-for-de-lousing.html
[http://perma.cc/3MSK-X7GB].
159 DDT Regulatory History, supra note 157.
160 AM.
CANCER
SOC’Y,
Known
and
Probable
Human
Carcinogens,
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/general-info/known-and-probable-humancarcinogens.html [http://perma.cc/K4V5-HK92].
153
154
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days to thirty years in the environment.161 It is resistant to
metabolism, which combined with its long half-life, allows DDT
to build up in the food chain. Many insects developed resistance
to DDT.162
Rachel Carson, a preeminent biologist,163 noticed the
relationship between DDT and the decline of raptors by
disrupting their reproductive cycle. The chemical resulted in the
thinning of their eggshells, resulting in their collapse as the
mothers were nesting on them. The populations of eagles, hawks,
falcons, condors, ospreys, and pelicans dropped as a result.
She documented the problem and then published Silent
Spring164 in 1962—one of the classic books of environmental
protection. Silent Spring quickly became a national sensation. It
alerted the American public to the dangers of toxins, especially
toxic chemicals.
The first major issue before the newly established EPA was
the fate of DDT. The EPA delayed in responding to a request to
rescind the registration of DDT.165 Judge Bazelon penned his
famous line on the onset of the environmental era:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long and
fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts.
For many years, courts have treated administrative policy decisions
with great deference, confining judicial attention primarily to matters
of procedure. On matters of substance, the courts regularly upheld
agency action, with a nod in the direction of the “substantial evidence”
test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise. . . .
As a result of expanding doctrines of standing and reviewability, and
new statutory causes of action, courts are increasingly asked to review
administrative action that touches on fundamental personal interests
in life, health, and liberty. These interests have always had a special
claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the economic interests
at stake in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding.166

161 DDT
(General
Fact
Sheet),
NAT’L
PESTICIDE
INFO.
CTR.,
http://npic.orst.edu/factsheets/ddtgen.pdf [http://perma.cc/CN7H-ECSH] (last updated
1999).
162 Id.
163 Her other books include UNDER THE SEA-WIND (1941), THE SEA AROUND US
(1951), THE EDGE OF THE SEA (1955), and THE SENSE OF WONDER (1965). She also
extensively published essays and short articles.
164 CARSON, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
165 See Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court
viewed the silence on the request to suspend the DDT registration as a final decision,
which was thereby reviewable. No adequate explanation supported the failure to act.
166 Id. at 597–98.
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The EPA banned DDT in 1972,167 followed, of course, by
litigation. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) provides for the cancellation of misbranded pesticides. 168
Misbranding occurs if an insecticide “used as directed or in
accordance with commonly recognized practice . . . shall be injurious
to living man or other vertebrate animals.”169
One claim against the EPA’s DDT ban was that the agency
lacked substantial evidence in the record.170 Seven months of
testimony produced inconsistent evidence, a not unusual result.171
The court felt substantial evidence existed in the record to show
the hazardous nature of DDT even if it was not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.172 The Administrator found “DDT is hazardous
because of its inherent properties: its persistence, mobility, and
lipid solubility.”173 He concluded DDT posed “an unacceptable risk
to man and his environment.”174 Inconsistent evidence might have
justified a contrary conclusion, but was insufficient to vitiate the
Administrator’s decision.175 The EPA followed up the DDT
litigation by banning replacement pesticides.176
Two cases, one involving leaded gas and the other asbestos,
proceeded through the judiciary in parallel tracks, wrestling with
the legislative standard of “endanger.”
B.

Leaded Gas: Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency177
Early gasoline caused a knocking problem in cars.
Tetraethyllead was found to be an effective anti-knock additive to
gasoline as well as increasing the octane level in gas. However,
the lead was emitted in auto exhausts, posing a substantial
public health threat,178 especially to children.

The EPA technically cancelled the registration of all pesticides containing DDT.
7 U.S.C. § 135(a)(5) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136).
Id. § 135(z)(2)(g) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 136).
170 The other claim was a violation of NEPA. Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Env’t Prot.
Agency, 489 F.2d 1247, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
171 Id. at 1252.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1252–53.
176 The EPA followed up the DDT litigation by subsequently suspending the
registration of the aldrin and dieldrin pesticides. Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Env’t Prot.
Agency, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Env’t Prot.
Agency, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
177 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
178 Lead at high exposure levels can be fatal, cause anemia, severe intestinal cramps,
paralysis of nerves, and fatigue. Extensive litigation over lead paint and its risks to
children has resulted. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008).
167
168
169
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The EPA promulgated a schedule for phasing out lead from
gasoline. The Clean Air Act authorized the EPA to regulate gasoline
additives that “endanger the public health or welfare,”179 but did not
define “endanger.” The EPA relied on theoretical, epidemiological,
and clinical tests to establish the risks of lead in the atmosphere,
especially near highways and homes with lead paint.180
Judge J. Skelly Wright started the court’s decision with
prescient words:
Man’s ability to alter his environment has developed far more rapidly
than his ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his alterations.
It is only recently that we have begun to appreciate the danger posed
by unregulated modification of the world around us, and have created
watchdog agencies whose task it is to warn us, and protect us, when
technological
‘advances’
present
dangers
unappreciated—or
unrevealed—by their supporters. Such agencies, unequipped with
crystal balls and unable to read the future, are nonetheless charged
with evaluating the effects of unprecedented environmental
modifications, often made on a massive scale. Necessarily, they must
deal with predictions and uncertainty, with developing evidence, with
conflicting evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at
all.181

The lead manufacturers argued for a “high quantum of
factual proof, proof of actual harm rather than of a ‘significant
risk of harm.’”182 They asserted the regulation has to be premised
on “factual proof of actual harm.”183
The court of appeals disagreed, looking to both case law and
the dictionary.184 The word “endanger” entails less than actual
harm; “endanger” is a precautionary standard; “will endanger”
presents a “significant risk of harm.”185 It means harm is
threatened.186 The court followed the reasoning of Reserve Mining
that “the magnitude of risk sufficient to justify regulation is
inversely proportionate to the harm to be avoided.”187 Danger can
be decided by “assessment of risks as well as by proof of facts.”188
The alternative approach, that of the lead manufacturers, would

541 F.2d at 7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1857f–6c(1)(A)).
Id. at 44.
181 Id. at 6.
182 Id. at 12.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 13.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 19 (citing Rsrv. Mining Co. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 528–29 (8th
Cir. 1975)).
188 Id. at 24.
179
180
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mean the agencies would have to wait for actual harm, to be
reactive rather than preventative.189
The opinion further addresses the demand for a high degree
of proof to justify a regulation, or ban:
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public
health, and the decision that of an expert administrator, we will not
demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect. Such proof
may be impossible to obtain if the precautionary purpose of the
statute is to be served.190

Judge Wright reaffirmed the standard of judicial review, the
yet to be named Chevron Doctrine, by following the earlier DDT
case:
In the case at bar our task is made somewhat simpler than the
agency’s by adhering conscientiously to the proper scope of judicial
review of administrative action, i.e., we as a court are confronted with
a problem in administrative law, not in chemistry, biology, medicine,
or ecology. It is the administrative agency which has been called upon
to hear and evaluate testimony in all scientific fields relevant to its
ultimate question of permission or prohibition of the sale and use of
DDT. The EPA Administrator had an opportunity to make a careful
study of the record of seven months of public hearings and the
summaries of evidence prepared for him, heard oral argument, and
now has arrived at a decision to ban most uses of DDT. It is his
decision which we must review; we are not to make the same decision
ourselves.191

C.

Reserve Mining Cases
The Eighth Circuit asked: “[W]hat manner of judicial
cognizance may be taken of the unknown[?]”192
Two steel companies formed a subsidiary, Reserve Mining, to
process Minnesota taconite into iron ore. Sixty-seven thousand
tons daily of tailings were discharged into Lake Superior and the
atmosphere.193 Reserve Mining would normally be a pollution
issue. No harm had yet been shown to public health and any

Id. at 25.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 37 n.77 (quoting Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Env’t Prot. Agency (Coahoma), 489
F.2d 1247, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
192 Rsrv. Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974).
193 Thomas R. Huffman, Exploring the Legacy of Reserve Mining: What Does the
Longest Environmental Trial in History Tell Us About the Meaning of American
Environmentalism?, 12 J. POL’Y HIST. 339, 340–41 (2000).
189
190
191
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health danger was not imminent.194 However, asbestos was found
in the air and water discharges, creating a toxic health risk. 195
The critical issue for the Court of Appeals was if an injunction
should be issued in light of the uncertainties of the risk. The
district court issued a preliminary injunction based on the public
health risks of breathing and drinking asbestos fibers.196
Reserve Mining is a pioneering case in using epidemiology,
occupational health, and oncology.197 By 1970 asbestos was a
known carcinogen with a rising death toll from mesothelioma,
lung cancer, and asbestosis. The known health risks were from
inhaling asbestos, compounded by smoking. The evidence of an
imminent health hazard was speculative and conjectural.
Dr. Arnold Brown, a court appointed expert, opined “no adverse
health consequences could be scientifically predicted on the basis
of existing medical knowledge,”198 but “the presence of a known,
human carcinogen . . . is in my view cause for concern, and if there
are means of removing that human carcinogen from the
environment, that should then be done.”199 Studies have
established that airborne asbestos are a health risk, but the
evidence is lacking on asbestos fibers entering the digestive
tract.200 The extent to which the ingestion of asbestos fibers poses
a health risk is unknown, but Dr. Brown testified the possibility of
an increased risk of future cancer cannot be ignored.201
The court balanced the public interests and issued an
injunction, recognizing “[A] risk may be assessed from suspected,
but not completely substantiated, relationship between facts,
from trend among facts, from theoretical projections from
imperfect data, or from probative preliminary data not yet
certifiable as ‘fact.’”202 The court recognized the threat did not
require an immediate shutdown of the plant,203 affording Reserve
Mining a reasonable opportunity and time to abate the pollution
and threat to public health.204

194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Rsrv. Mining Co. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 500 (8th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 501.
United States v. Rsrv. Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974).
Huffman, supra note 193, at 347.
514 F.2d at 506.
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 517.
Id. at 529 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 507.
Id. at 537.
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The court though in an earlier opinion recognized: “[W]e are a
court of law, governed by rules of proof, and unknowns may not be
substituted for proof of a demonstrable hazard to the public health.”205
The dilemma for the court was that proof did not exist
showing asbestos in water is harmful to humans:
In the absence of proof of a reasonable risk of imminent or actual
harm, a legal standard requiring immediate cessation of industrial
operations will cause unnecessary economic loss, including
unemployment, and, in a case such as this, jeopardize a continuing
domestic source of critical metals without conferring adequate
countervailing benefits.206

The court recognized the discharges into the air and water
posed “a potential threat to the public health.”207 The court
thereby held the discharges posed a danger to public health. It
mandated filtration of drinking water for the affected
communities.
The judges looked to the recent appellate decision in the lead
gas case, quoting Judge Wright:
The meaning of “endanger” is, I hope, beyond dispute. Case law and
dictionary definition agree that endanger means something less than
actual harm. When one is endangered, harm is threatened; no actual
injury need ever occur. . . . ‘Endanger,’ . . . is not a standard prone to
factual proof alone. Danger is a risk, and so can only be decided by
assessment of risks. [A] risk may be assessed from suspected, but not
completely substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends
among facts, from theoretical projections from imperfect data, or from
probative preliminary data not yet certifiable as ‘fact.’208

They further wrote Congress used the word “‘endangering’ in a
precautionary or preventative sense, and, therefore, evidence of

Rsrv. Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1084 (8th Cir. 1974).
514 F.2d at 537. See also Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Refin. Co., 709 P.2d 782, 791
(Wash. 1985).
207 514 F.2d at 500.
208 Id. at 529. The judges disposed of the air pollution claims by finding a violation of
Minnesota’s air pollution rules, thereby constituting a public nuisance. Id. at 524. A
significant side issue in Reserve Mining is that the appellate court removed District Judge
Miles Lord from the case for overt bias against Reserve Mining and disregard of earlier
holdings by the appellate court. Rsrv. Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 185 (8th Cir.
1976). The court felt “Judge Lord seems to have shed the robe of the judge and to have
assumed the mantle of the advocate.” Id. For a history of the irascible Judge Miles Lord,
see ROBERTA WALBURN, MILES LORD: THE MAVERICK JUDGE WHO BROUGHT CORPORATE
AMERICA TO JUSTICE (2017). For general discussions of Reserve Mining, see THOMAS F.
BASTOW, “THIS VAST POLLUTION . . .” (1986), and FRANK D. SCHAUMBURG, JUDGMENT
RESERVED: A LANDMARK ENVIRONMENTAL CASE (1976).
205
206
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potential harm as well as actual harm comes within the purview of
that term.”209
Reserve Mining proceeded in 1980 to dispose of the tailings
on land ponds five miles from the lake.210 Clarity has returned to
Lake Superior.
The effect of these trifecta cases is that agencies can take a
prophylactic approach to toxic risk analysis, short of a
zero-tolerance standard.211 The word “endangering” is to be
construed as “precautionary” or “preventative.”212 Actual proof of
harm is not therefore a prerequisite for judicial action.
D. Edwards v. New York Times and the First Amendment
The DDT controversy also gave rise to a critical First
Amendment decision on the right of the media to cover
controversial issues. The debate over the fate of DDT was highly
contentious.
The National Audubon Society (NAS) conducts an annual
Christmas Bird Count, followed by publishing an annual report.
Spotters, often referred to as “birders,” go out annually at the
same location to count birds by species. The raptor count had
been rising seemingly despite the growing presence of pesticides
in the environment. The preface to the 1971 report explained the
apparent discrepancy was because the annual count has more
and better trained counters, resulting in a more accurate count.
It continued: “Any time you hear a ‘scientist’ say the opposite,
you are in the presence of someone who is being paid to lie, or is
parroting something he knows little about.”213 DDT supporters
asserted a ban was “deliberately genocidal.”214
The NAS provided five names to the New York Times
reporter, who was able to contact three of the five. They denied
the accusations with one calling it “almost libelous.”215
The Times printed the story including the denials. The
scientists sued for defamation. The Second Circuit upheld the
Times on First Amendment grounds. The judges held the article
was newsworthy. The court recognized the right of the media to
514 F.2d at 528.
Huffman, supra note 193, at 342.
See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(essentially a zero-tolerance level for benzene in the workplace).
212 514 F.2d at 528.
213 Edwards v. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1977).
214 Id. at 116.
215 Id. at 117.
209
210
211
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cover and report on controversies. The media has a privilege of
neutral reportage.
Succinctly stated, when a responsible, prominent organization like the
National Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public
figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested
reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter’s private views
regarding their validity.216

The court further held that the denials by the named
scientists did not constitute constitutional malice, the standard
established in New York Times v. Sullivan.217 The Times reported
both the accusation and the denials.
The First Amendment protections extended to the media also
protect project opponents. Developers were prone to bringing
lawsuits against opponents, hoping to chill their opposition.218
Professors Pring and Canan of the University of Denver Law
School labeled these lawsuits “SLAPP” actions (Strategic
Litigation Against Public Participants).219
California and other states have enacted anti-SLAPP
statutes to ban these lawsuits.220 In addition, if the public
participants win the original SLAPP suit, they can then bring
abuse of process and malicious prosecution suits against the
original plaintiffs.
VI. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ESA): TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY V. HILL221
The Tellico Dam was ninety-five percent complete on the
Little Tennessee River in Tennessee when a small, endangered
species, the Snail Darter, was discovered downstream of the

216 Id. at 120. The Audubon case and the privilege of neutral reporting is the subject
of an article from the St. John’s Law Review Symposium, Celebrating the Centennial of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment in the Second
Circuit: Reflections on Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., the Past and the
Future, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 731 (1991).
217 556 F.2d at 120–21.
218 See, e.g., Note, Counterclaim and Countersuit Harassment of Private
Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its Implications, and Proposed Solutions, 74
MICH. L. REV. 106 (1975); ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895 (Tex.
2017) (determining application of the Texas Citizens Participation Act).
219 Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 385
(1988); GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT (1996).
220 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16–425.17 (West 2020).
221 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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dam.222 The dam’s completion had been held up by NEPA
litigation with the injunction about to be lifted.223
The ESA, like many of the federal environmental statutes,
contains a citizen suit provision,224 which allows private citizens
to sue to enforce environmental statutes.225 Section 7 of the
statute provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be
critical . . . .226

The statute thereby protects not only the species, but also its
critical habitat. Destroying the critical habitat of a species can
decimate a species indirectly rather than directly. Section 9
extends the Act’s protections to private parties, prohibiting any
person from taking any endangered or threatened species.227
Chief Justice Burger228 wrote the 6-3 decision upholding the
ESA and the appellate court decision granting a permanent
injunction against the dam.229 He wrote the ESA is “the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation[,]”230 and “[t]he plain intent of

222 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM: HOW PORK-BARREL
POLITICS ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A RIVER 1 (2013) (providing context and
a comprehensive history of the Tellico Dam saga as the lead attorney for the plaintiffs).
223 See Env’t Def. Fund v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1015 (E.D. Tenn.
1973), aff’d 492 F.2d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 1974).
224 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)(1) (West 2020).
225 For a discussion of citizen suits, see generally Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The
Teeth in Public Participation, 25 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10141, 10141 (1995);
Jeffrey G. Miller & Brooke S. Dorner, The Constitutionality of Citizen Suit Provisions in
Federal Environmental Statutes, 27 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 401, 401 (2012).
226 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (West 2020); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(6) (West 2020)
(“The term ‘endangered species’ means any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class
Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection under the
provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.”).
227 See 16 U.S.C.A § 1538(a)(1)(B) (West 2020); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19) (West
2020) (“The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”).
228 The story is that the Chief Justice was opposed to the statute. However, he
changed positions to write the strong, majority opinion when he realized the Court was
going to uphold the statute, hoping to draw a legislative backled Species Act Lessons Over
30 Years, and the Legacy of the Snail Darter, a Small Fish in a Pork Barrel, 34 ENV’T L.
289, 304 n.35 (2004); PLATER, supra note 222, at 267.
229 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193–95 (1978).
230 Id. at 180.
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Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”231
The Chief Justice recognized:
One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose
terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species
Act. Its very words affirmatively command all federal agencies “to
insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not
jeopardize the continued existence” of an endangered species or
“result in the destruction or modification of habitat of such
species . . . .”232

He continued by asserting that the “language admits of no
exception[,]”233 and “that Congress intended endangered species
to be afforded the highest of priorities.”234 Chief Justice Burger
further recognized that Congress placed an “incalculable” value
on endangered species.235
The Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority turned a
sleeper statute into a great source of environmental protection.
The ESA lacks the usual statutory license, permit, and variance
provisions with one limited exception.236 Injunctive relief is
almost automatic under the statute when endangered species are
threatened on public or private lands.237 The usual equitable
requirement of balancing the equities, including a cost-benefit
analysis, is inapplicable because “Congress viewed the value of
endangered species as ‘incalculable.’”238
Congress responded to the decision by creating the seven-member
ESA Committee, commonly nicknamed the “God Committee” or “God
Squad.”239 A majority of five members is necessary to exempt an action
from the ESA.240 The God Committee unanimously reaffirmed the

Id. at 184.
Id. at 173.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 174.
235 Id. at 187.
236 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (West 2020) (codifying Congress’ 1982 amendment
to the Endangered Species Act to allow a permit for a “taking otherwise prohibited . . . if
such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity”).
237 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1982).
238 See 437 U.S. at 187–88.
239 The God Committee consists of the Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior,
the Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Agency, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, and an elected
official from the affected state. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(e)(3) (West 2020).
240 See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1) (West 2020). The conditions specified in the statute
are: i) no reasonable alternative to the agency’s action; ii) the benefits of the proposal
231
232
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decision in favor of the Snail Darter, thereby standing against
completion of the dam.241
The Tennessee delegation in Congress subsequently attached a
rider to a budget bill. The rider required the completion and
operation of the dam, which opened on November 29, 1979.242 The
Snail Darter survived elsewhere, but the completion of the Tellico
Dam effectively resulted in the end of the era of big dams.243 The
ESA received a broad mandate from the Supreme Court.244
VII. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine harkens back to the Justinian
Code: “By the law of nature these things are common to
mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the
shores of the sea.”245 The Justinian Code was a compilation of
existing Roman legal principles. The public trust section reflects
a preexisting history.246 Both civil law and common law
jurisdictions recognize the public trust doctrine.
The Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. Illinois247 recognized the public trust doctrine in U.S. law.248
The public trust doctrine then mostly fell into the background,
although California recognized it over the years. In 1869, the
Illinois legislature granted 1,000 acres of submerged lands of the
Chicago waterfront, namely the bed of Lake Michigan, to the

clearly outweigh the benefits of any alternative course of action consistent with the
conservation of species or its critical habitat; iii) the action is of the public interest and is
of regional or national significance; and iv) neither the federal agency nor the external
applicant made irreversible commitments of resources. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(1)(A) (West
2020).
241 See PLATER, supra note 222, at 5.
242 See id. at 341.
243 See Dan Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric Power Generation in
the United States, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1723, 1763 n.196 (2012) (referring to the completion
of the Seven Oaks Dam on the Santa Ana River as the major exception to provide flood
protection in Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino Counties in California in response to
the river’s history of severe flooding).
244 But see J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme
Court, 36 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 487, 490 (2012) (positing that the Supreme Court, in
subsequent opinions, retreated somewhat from the lofty levels of TVA v. Hill by placing
restrictions on standing and imposing additional conditions on recovery).
245 J. INST. 2.1.1.
246 One major situation giving rise to the doctrine dealt with villa owners and their
costal estates. The villa owners sought to extend their properties into the seas with large
fishponds, preventing local fishermen-citizens from fishing. See Bruce W. Frier, The
Roman Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 J. ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641, 643–44
(2019).
247 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
248 See id. at 435–37.
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Illinois Central Railroad.249 It revoked the grant just four years
later.250 The Supreme Court held the state holds the lands in
trust for the people for the purposes of the public trust.251 Small
grants can be made, but not an “abdication of the general control
of the state over lands under the navigable waters.”252
Professor Joseph Sax published in 1970 his seminal article
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention,253 positing the public trust doctrine as a
critical principle of environmental law. His thesis, after an
extensive review of the history of the doctrine, was “to encourage
public agencies to engage in creative water management that
serves the overall public interest.”254
He looked at the suspicious path of the Illinois legislation that
transferred the waterfront to the railroad, as well as similar
transactions elsewhere in America,255 to posit this premise: “When a
state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon
any governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate
that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the
self-interest of private parties.”256
The traditional protections of the public trust doctrine are
fishing, commerce, and navigation measured from the medium
low water mark and the median high water mark (the wet sand
area). The California Supreme Court extended the public trust
doctrine to include changing public needs, such as the
preservation of lands in their natural state, open space, and
environments for food and habitat for birds and marine life.257

See id. at 448–54.
See id. at 449.
See id. at 463–64.
252 Id. at 452–53.
253 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). It is one of the classic environmental
law articles.
254 David Aladjem, The Public Trust Doctrine: New Frontiers for Sustainable Water
Resources Management, NAT’L RES. & ENV’T, Summer 2010, at 17 (citing to Sax, supra
note 253).
255 See Sax, supra note 253, at 547. A different perspective on the Illinois Central
transaction is in Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American
Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799
(2004).
256 Sax, supra note 253, at 490.
257 See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); see also Wilbour v.
Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1969) (indicating public trust includes rights of
fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational uses).
249
250
251
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The West was settled for resource exploitation, be it mining
for gold, silver, and lead, farming, ranching, forestry, or fishing.
Water development in the West was essential since much of the
West, especially outside the coastal areas, is dry. The need was to
utilize the West’s scarce water resources. Water Law is a matter
of state law. The western states, led by California258 and
Colorado,259 adopted the prior appropriation system of water
rights rather than the riparian system of England and the East.
California, a state of constant population growth since the
days of the 49ers, was as culpable as elsewhere of destroying
wetlands. For example, the San Francisco Bay shrunk by a third,
in the century leading up to the creation of the San Francisco
Bay Conservation and Development Commission.260 Corruption
was widespread in the dispersal of public lands.261
Americans leveled hills, drained, filled and channeled
wetlands, bridged, tunneled, dammed, diverted rivers, clear cut
the forests, mined the nation’s lands in the first 260 years of the
country’s existence. California was no exception beginning with
the Gold Miners of 1849, who used hydraulic mining to level hills
in the search for gold.
The growing pueblo of Los Angeles developed its existing
water supply, and then under the leadership of William
Mulholland diverted the Owens River to the San Fernando
Valley in 1913. Owens Valley was a rich agricultural area. The
city surreptitiously bought up the water rights to the valley. In
the debates leading up to the diversion, Mulholland said: “If you
don’t get the water, you won’t need it.”262 He said when the gates
were opened: “There it is, take it.”263
The Owens Valley diversion epitomized the West’s efforts to
bring water to the people rather than the people to the water by

See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 11–15 (1855).
See Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553–54 (1872); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6
Colo. 443, 446 (1882).
260 See S.F. BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM’N, 2018 ANN. REP. 5 (2019),
http://bcdc.ca.gov/reports/2018AnnualReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/AU2J-43F2].
About 35 miles of Bay habitat have been restored since creation of the BCDC in 1965. Id.
Both Oakland and San Francisco International Airports are on filled-in land of the Bay.
261 Professor Sax postulates that much of the public trust litigation in the United
States developed as a reaction to legislative largesse with the handling of the public
domain. See Sax, supra note 253, at 490–91 n.62.
262 DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE POWERS THAT BE 115 (2000).
263 Amy Pyle, ‘There It Is. Take It …’ and for 75 Years, the City Has, L.A. TIMES (Nov.
18,
1988),
http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-11-18-me-614-story.html
[http://perma.cc/2LY9-ECHW].
258
259
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reshaping the natural environment.264 Los Angeles took it, grew,
and outgrew the Owens Valley water. It went another 90 miles up
the Sierra Nevada Mountains to Mono Lake, diverting four of the
five tributaries of Mono Lake into the Los Angeles Aqueduct.265
A classic example of the Mid-Nineteenth Century
environmental disregard was the Los Angeles Department of
Water Policy’s proposed diversion of waters from Mono Lake to
its existing Owens Valley diversion.266 California’s Water Board
decision said:
[I]t is indeed unfortunate that the City’s proposed development will
result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but there
is apparently nothing that this office can do to prevent it False This
office . . . has no alternative but to dismiss all protests based upon the
possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake and the effect that
the diversion of water from these streams may have upon the
aesthetic and recreational use of the Basin.267

The environmental consequences on the fertile Owens Valley
were devastating; the Valley was often turned into a windblown,
dusty desert. The environmental effects on Mono Lake were equally
devastating. The Lake had shrunk by a third from its-pre-diversion
level of 85 square miles to 60.3 square miles in 1979 while its
surface level dropped 43 feet.268 The Lake has a high salt
concentration which supports the brine shrimp population which
feed nesting and migratory birds.269 The islands in the Lake
provided the breeding grounds for 95% of the California Gull
population.270 The lake’s level continuously dropped, exposing the
gull population on the disappearing islands to coyotes.271

264 Another example is San Francisco’s diversion of water from the Tuolumne River in
the Sierra Nevada Mountains to supply water to San Francisco and other Bay Area
communities.
265 The history of Los Angeles’ struggles for water to serve a burgeoning population
are well-documented. See LES STANDIFORD, WATER TO THE ANGELS: WILLIAM
MULHOLLAND, HIS MONUMENTAL AQUEDUCT, AND THE RISE OF LOS ANGELES (1st ed.
2015); WILLIAM DEVERELL & TOM SITTON, WATER AND LOS ANGELES: A TALE OF THREE
RIVERS, 1900–1941 (2016); CATHERINE MULHOLLAND, WILLIAM MULHOLLAND AND THE
RISE OF LOS ANGELES (2000). For a broader analysis of the dry West’s struggles for water,
see NORRIS HUNDLEY JR., WATER AND THE WEST (1975) and the classic MARC REISNER,
CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1993).
266 Professor Ryan has written extensively on the Mono Lake litigation. See Erin
Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono Lake: The Historic
Saga of “National Audubon Society v. Superior Court,” 45 ENV’T L. 561 (2015).
267 Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 714 (Cal. 1983)
(citation omitted).
268 See id.
269 Id. at 715.
270 Id. at 716.
271 See id.
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The conflict between diversion and the public trust doctrine
came to a head in the California Supreme Court decision in
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court272 echoing Professor
Sax’s thesis. The California Supreme Court held:
[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use
public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of
the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in
rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the
purposes of the trust.273

The California Supreme held the public trust doctrine
protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of
non-navigable tributaries.274 No vested right exists to the waters
protected by the public trust.275
The result is that the state “retains continuing supervisory
control over its navigable waters and the lands beneath those
waters.”276 The state can thereby reconsider prior decisions. The
holding therefore is that some body of the state has to reconsider
the allocation of the Mono Lake waters.277
The Mono Lake case changed both the settled expectations of
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, which had
been diverting Owens Valley and Mono Lake waters for decades
pursuant to permits issued by the state, and permit holders
throughout the West. The California Water Resources Control
Board in 1993 ordered minimum stream flows restored and
imposed a minimum water level for Mono Lake.278 Los Angeles
and the environmentalists reached a full agreement on the
diversions in 2013.279

See id. at 712.
Id. at 724. For a look back at the Mono Lake case, see Craig Anthony (Tony)
Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4
WYO. L. REV. 1 (2004).
274 See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 721.
275 See id. at 729.
276 Id. at 727.
277 See id. at 728–29.
278 See Louis Sahagun, L.A., Conservationists Reach Agreement to Repair Mono Lake
Damage, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-xpm2013-aug-23-la-me-mono-20130824story.html#:~:text=Ending%20decades%20of%20bitter%20disputes,World%20War%20II%
2Dera%20aqueduct [http://perma.cc/EMQ9-3TDS].
279 Id.
272
273
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The Audubon case effectively opened and reopened water
law in the West to instream flow protecting environmental
values, habitat protection and fish flows.
The Justinian Code and the public trust doctrine became the
basis of Juliana v. United States,280 which could result in
revolutionary changes in United States environmental Law.
Nineteen minors aged 8 to 19 filed suit in 2015 against the
United States seeking injunctive relief against the federal
government’s contributions to global warming.281 They advanced
three different theories for relief: 1) a constitutional right exists
to a clean, healthy environment; 2) just as the Justinian Code led
to the public trust doctrine over water, so too should it create an
atmospheric trust over the air;282 and 3) the public trust doctrine
applies to the federal government as well as state
governments.283 The District Court granted relief on all three
theories,284 but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
standing to the plaintiffs, thereby dismissing the case.285
VIII. MINING
A.

Hydraulic Mining
Gold was discovered on January 24, 1848 at Sutter’s Mill in
California. A gold rush ensued with the 49ers coming from
around the world. The early miners panned for gold—a laborious,
inefficient method of gold mining.286
The miners soon discovered high pressure hoses could rip the
soil off hills, being funneled into sluices where the gold would
drop to the bottom. The environmental consequences of hydraulic
mining were catastrophic. Trees were stripped off the hills to

947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947
F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
282 For a discussion of the Justinian Code’s background of the Atmospheric Trust
argument, see Erin Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust: Navigating the
Public and Private Interests in Public Trust Resource Commons, 10 GEO. WASH. J.
ENERGY & ENV’T L. 39 (2019); J.B. Ruhl & Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Roman Public Trust
Doctrine: What Was It, and Does It Support an Atmospheric Trust?, 47 ECOLOGY L. Q. 117
(2020).
283 See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. at 1233.
284 Id. at 1250, 1253, 1259.
285 See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1174–75 (2020).
286 For a history of the gold mining techniques in California, see Snowy Range
Reflections Staff, Mining Techniques of the Sierra Nevada and Gold Country,
2
J.
SIERRA
NEV.
HIST.
&
BIOGRAPHY
(2009),
https://www.sierracollege.edu/ejournals/jsnhb/v2n1/miningtechniques.html
[http://perma.cc/55TA-WDD4].
280
281
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facilitate mining. Hills were leveled, rivers were narrowed,
navigation was impaired, and farmland was buried. Flooding
intensified as streams were blocked or clogged. Erosion was
intensified. Fish populations declined.
Aggrieved farmers sued the largest hydraulic mining
company.287 The federal judge issued an injunction after two
years of considering the case, holding that the process constitutes
a public and private nuisance.288 This early environmental
victory, the first in the United States, is little known today.
B.

Strip Mining (Surface Mining)289
Coal fueled the industrial revolution and continues to
generate electricity and heat through much of the world despite
the global commitment to reducing carbon emissions.
Underground mining was historically the source of coal. The fuel
is dirty and the consequences on Appalachia environmentally
disastrous.290 Coal production started shifting to surface mining,
also known as strip mining, about a half century ago.
Unreclaimed strip mining is an environmental disaster,
leaving a moon-like landscape.291 John Prine, a folk singer, wrote
the song Paradise about a coal company’s strip mine in Paradise,
Kentucky.292 In response, President Ford twice vetoed a surface
mining reclamation act.293 President Carter finally signed the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) in
1977.294 Severe restrictions are contained in the statute,
including protection of alluvial valleys, permits, reclamation, and
the power of the Secretary of the Interior to designate areas as

287 See The Debris Case. Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 16 F. 25, 26
(D. Cal. 1883).
288 See id. at 27–28.
289 Surface mining can be referred to as open cut mining or strip mining. I prefer to
use “strip mining” because the practice strips the surface off the land.
290 See HENRY CAUDILL, NIGHT COMES TO THE CUMBERLANDS (1962).
291 Thousands of miles of Appalachian streams are contaminated with acid waters.
Water supplies are imperiled. Recreation and industrial uses are curtailed while
vegetation and fish life imperiled. See Denis Binder, A Novel Approach to Reasonable
Regulation of Strip Mining, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 339, 343–45 (1973). For a discussion of the
environmental impacts of strip mining in the western states, see Denis Binder, Strip
Mining, The West and the Nation, 12 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1977).
292 JOHN PRINE, Paradise, on JOHN PRINE (Atlantic Records 1971).
293 S. 425 received a pocket veto by President Ford. See 120 C ONG . REC. 41996–97
(1974). H.R. 25 was vetoed the next year. See Veto of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1975, Message from the President of the United States, 94 CONG. H.
NO. 94–160 (May 20, 1975).
294 Surface Mining and Control Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95–87, 91 Stat.
445 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328).
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unsuitable for surface mining, if the mining operation could
adversely affect fragile or historical lands in a manner that could
cause substantial damage to important historic, cultural,
scientific, and aesthetic values to national systems.295 The land is
to be restored to its “approximate original contour.”296
A coal miners association claimed the statute was
unconstitutional for violating the tenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court upheld the statute in Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Association, Inc.,297 under the Tenth
Amendment as an example of cooperative federalism. The federal
government defers primary enforcement to states if the states
agree and meet the federal requirements.298 The result was a
comprehensive state and national regulation of strip mining,
substantially reducing the environmental degradation it caused.
The statute covers mining, operations, cleanup and
restoration.299 The Court also reiterated its past decisions holding
that the Commerce Clause can displace states’ exercises of their
police powers.300
SMCRA is an example of the statutory model of cooperative
federalism, which is characteristic of several environmental
statutes. The federal government is prepared to unilaterally
regulate an environmental problem, but shares regulation and
enforcement with states as long as they meet conditions
prescribed by Congress. The states can do the primary regulation
and enforcement, but the federal agency has oversight
responsibilities.
The Court recognized a narrow test for judging the
constitutionality of a federal regulatory program affecting
interstate commerce. The test is simple: does a rational basis
exist for the Congressional action?301 The Commerce Clause is a
grant of plenary power to Congress.302
The regulatory program had several abuses in practice,
including outright violations.303 A statutory exception subject to
substantial violation was the two-acre exception intended to
See 30 U.S.C.A. § 1265 (Westlaw through P.L. 116–252).
Id. at § 1265(b)(3).
452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981).
298 See 30 U.S.C.A § 1253 (Westlaw through P.L. 116–252).
299 Id.
300 See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 292–93.
301 Id. at 276.
302 Id.
303 See Lily Whiteman, Recent Efforts to Stop Abuse of SMCRA: Have They Gone Far
Enough, 20 ENV’T L. 167, 169–70 (1990).
295
296
297
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protect small “mom and pop” operations. One ploy was the
“string of pearls” scheme, whereby a series of parallel pits were
mined on a seam.304 Congress abolished the two acre exception in
1987.305
A more recent problem is mountain top mining whereby coal
miners chop off the top of mountains to mine the coal.306 Augers
used to drill into hills; now they are demolished from the top. 307
Mountain top mining devastates forests, fills stream with debris,
and kills off native species.308
Only decades later did the country move away from fossil
fuels, especially coal, for electricity production; this resulted in a
substantial reduction in both surface and underground coal
mining.
IX. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Equity developed in England when the strict common law
rules could not provide relief to deserving plaintiffs. Injunctive
relief is the primary, but not exclusive equitable remedy. The
normal remedy under the Administrative Procedures Act is
judicial review and reversal, but injunctions are an alternative
remedy for ongoing operations.
Equity, which started out as a flexible remedy, has developed
its own rules. The normal requirements for injunctive relief are
1) An inadequate remedy at law; 2) Irreparable injury to plaintiff
if the injunction is denied; 3) Balancing of the equites; and 4) the
public interest. Injunctive relief is discretionary.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 936 lists six
factors to be considered in balancing the equities:
Sec. 936. Factors in Determining Appropriateness of Injunction.
1) The appropriateness of the remedy of injunction against a tort
depends upon a comparative appraisal of all the factors in the case,
including the following primary factors:
a) the nature of the interest to be protected,
b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other

Id. at 171–72.
See Act to Amend the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 100–34, § 201, 101 Stat. 300 (1987).
306 See e.g., John McQuaid, Mining the Mountains, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 2009),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/mining-the-mountains-130454620/
[http://perma.cc/9NVF-RD9W].
307 Id.
308 Id.
304
305
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remedies,
c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit,
d) any related misconduct on the part of plaintiff,
e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is
granted and to the plaintiff if it is denied,
f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and
g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or
judgment.309

The question arose regarding whether environmental laws
preempted traditional equitable balancing, with the argument
being that the strong public policy of environmental protection
should control the balancing. For example, the Supreme Court in
TVA v. Hill did not allow a balancing of the equities in enforcing
the Endangered species Act.310
For example, the Navy used Vieques Island off Puerto Rico
for weapons training for decades.311 A lawsuit was filed alleging
the Navy’s ongoing shelling operations violated the Clean Water
Act for discharging munitions into navigable waters without a
permit.312 The district court found a violation of the CWA and
required the Navy to seek a permit, but denied issuance on an
injunctive.313 The court of appeals reversed, reasoning the Clean
Water Act removed equitable discretion,314 thus requiring
immediate injunctive relief for the violations.315
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate tribunal, 316
holding that equitable discretion remained under the Clean
Water Act. The traditional balancing of the equities remains, but
with a specific caveat from the Court—courts of equity, in
exercising their discretion, “should pay particular regard for the
public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of
injunction.”317 The Court held that the basis for equitable relief is
“irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”318

309 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (AM. L. INST. 1977). The injunction
sections of the Restatement (3rd) of Torts have not been finalized at the time this article
was written.
310 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187–88 (1978).
311 See Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646, 655 (D. P.R. 1979).
312 See id. at 663.
313 See id. at 664, 708.
314 See Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F. 2d 835, 861–62 (1st Cir. 1981).
315 See id.
316 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 307 (1982).
317 Id. at 312.
318 Id.

Do Not Delete

2020]

5/17/2021 8:08 AM

The Pillars of Modern American Environmental Law

41

The Court distinguished TVA v. Hill by noting the
Endangered Species Act left no discretion.319 Congress made it
“abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor of
affording endangered species the highest of priorities.”320
A quarter century later, the Court reaffirmed Romer-Barcelo
in another Navy training program, this time sonar-training,
emphasizing that any harm to the plaintiffs is offset by the public
interest. The Court further recognized the public interest of
national security. The Court saw “no basis for jeopardizing
national security, as the present injunction does.”321
The effect of Weinberger and its progeny is a reaffirmation of
the basic equity premise that equitable relief is discretionary.
The public interest remains a major factor in balancing the
equities.
X. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
A.

Commerce Clause: City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey 322
The thirteen American colonies entered into the Articles of
Confederation upon achieving independence from England in the
Treaty of Paris. The Articles failed for several reasons, one of
which was restrictions existed on commerce between the states.
The Constitution replaced the Articles on March 4, 1789.
One of the major changes was to place Congress in control of
commerce between the states, displacing the individual states.
The Commerce Clause thereby became a major source of power
for the federal government, as well as a restraint on the states
(the “negative commerce clause”).
The federal government is a government of enumerated
powers, not plenary powers. The Commerce Clause is the
primary source of regulatory power.323 The Clause empowers
Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”324 The regulation of
commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause is limited to a
sufficient nexus between the proscribed act and interstate

319
320
321
322
323
324

Id. at 331.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32–33 (2008).
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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commerce.325 Other sources of power are the property, spending,
and taxation clauses.326
The Commerce Clause significantly serves not only as a
grant of power to Congress, but also as a restriction on state
powers.327 A primary goal of the Commerce Clause is to break
down barriers to the free flow of commerce.328 State and local
governments thereby lack the power to restrict the free flow of
commerce between the states.329
The natural inclination of states and local governments is to
obtain the benefits of commerce but place the burdens on others.
Philadelphia v. New Jersey330 is a prime example of this reality.
New Jersey was concerned about exhausting the capacity of its
landfills.331 It thereby banned the importation of out-of-state
solid or liquid waste (trash) except when the waste had economic
value.332 New Jersey’s statute was an act of economic
protectionism.333
The Supreme Court threw out the New Jersey act as a
restriction on the free flow of commerce.334 All items in interstate
commerce, including trash, are entitled to protection under the
Commerce Clause.335 The key is discrimination based on origin,
even for trash. The purpose of protecting the state “may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce
coming from outside the [s]tate unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”336 The critical
passage in the case is:

325 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
326 A case that combines issues of the Commerce, Property, Spending, and Taxation
Clauses is New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
327 See 437 U.S. at 622–23.
328 See id. at 623.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 628.
331 Id. at 625.
332 New Jersey allowed the importation of garbage to be fed to swine, any separated
waste material intended for a recycling or reclamation facility, municipal solid waste to be
processed into secondary materials, and pesticides, hazardous waste, chemical waste,
bulk liquid, and bulk semi-liquid to be treated, processed or recovered. Id. at 618–19, 619
n.2 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13-1I-10 (West Supp. 1978)).
333 Id. at 628–29.
334 Id. at 629.
335 Id. at 622.
336 Id. at 626–27. Apparently New York and New Jersey trash are basically identical
in content. Id. at 629. New Jersey was allowing New Jersey trash to be deposited in the
state’s landfill, but not New York trash. Id. New Jersey was thus discriminating based on
the state of origin. Id.
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[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation,
a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected. The clearest
example of such legislation is a law that overtly blocks the flow of
interstate commerce at a State’s borders. But where other legislative
objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination
against interstate trade, the Court has adopted a much more flexible
approach, the general contours of which were outlined in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc . . . .337

The Supreme Court further held a state had no right to give
its residents a preferred right of access over access to natural
resources within the state.338
Philadelphia v. New Jersey is the basis for striking down a
number of restrictions on commerce, including reciprocity
requirements,339 bans, taxation, preference with in-state
products, such as electricity, anti-exportation clauses,340 bans on
products transported through the state, and even voter approval
requirements.341
B.

Spending Clause342
An alternative enumerated source of power for
Congressional regulation is the Spending Clause: “The Congress
shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States . . . .”343 Congress can attach conditions to the receipt of
federal funds.344 Congress thereby uses money as a means of
inducing states to take actions they might otherwise oppose. For
example, the Supreme Court held in South Dakota v. Dole345
Congress could condition the receipt of federal highway funds

337 Id. at 624 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), which laid
out these markers: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes
one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
a lesser impact on interstate activities.”).
338 Id. at 627.
339 See Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871, 872–73 (10th Cir. 1980).
340 See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953, 960 (1982).
341 See Stablex Corp. v. Town of Hooksett, 456 A.2d 94, 101 (N.H. 1982).
342 A symposium on the Spending Clause can be found at Spending Clause
Symposium, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001), with articles by Professors Richard A. Epstein,
John C. Eastman, Erwin Chemerinsky, Earl M. Maltz, Bradley A. Smith, Denis Binder,
Celestine Richards McConville, and Lynn A. Baker.
343 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
344 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
345 Id.
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upon states raising the minimum drinking age to 21.346
Certain limitations apply though to government’s power
under the Spending Clause:
1) Spending must be in pursuit of the general welfare;
2) The intent to attach conditions must be articulated and
unambiguous;
3) The conditions must be reasonably related to the
articulated grant; and
4) The conditions cannot be barred by other Constitutional
provisions.347
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Nevada v. Skinner348 provides
an example of the Spending Clause in action. Gas was very
inexpensive through the 1960’s. Detroit’s response was to build
large, heavy gas guzzling vehicles. Two Arab oil embargoes in the
1970’s shot up the price of gas and focused attention on energy
conservation.349
A substantial way to conserve gas is to drive slower.
Congress attached a maximum speed limit of 55 miles per hour
(MPH) (the double nickel) to the receipt of federal highway
funds.350 The 55 MPH was unpopular in the vast open space of
the West. Nevada sued, claiming the potential loss of 95% of
federal highway funds was so coercive as to deprive it of any
choice in setting its speed limits.351 The argument is that the
state had no practical alternative but to comply because of the
potential loss of 95% of its highway funding.352 Nevada was
looking to the words of the 1937 case of Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis:353 “Our decisions have recognized that in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress
346 The federal government provides 95% of the funding for interstate and primary
road construction. See id.
347 Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990). The Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed that a condition attached to the
receipt of federal funds must bear “some relationship” to the funding’s purpose. New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
348 884 F.2d 445. Nevada played fast and loose with standing and the federal funding.
The Nevada statute raised the speed limit to 70 MPH, but included a self-executing
provision whereby the state’s speed limit would be lowered to the national speed limit if
federal officials threatened to cut off funding. Id. at 446.
349 Id. at 451.
350 See id. Congress during the Reagan Administration raised the national speed
limit to 65 MPH.
351 See id. Montana and Nevada lacked speed limits on sparsely populated rural
areas prior to Congress’ adoption of the 55 MPH national speed limit.
352 Id. at 448.
353 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns
into compulsion.’”354
The appellate court held the difficulty of assessing a state’s
financial capabilities made the coercion theory “highly suspect as
a method for resolving disputes between federal and state
governments.”355 Congress could have constitutionally imposed
the national speed limit pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Hence it could not constitute unconstitutional coercion under the
Spending Clause.356
C.

Property Clause: Kleppe v. New Mexico357
The federal government owns 28% of the nation’s land,358
especially concentrated in the western states.359 The issue is if
the federal government is a landowner subject to state or local
regulation or if the federal government possesses independent
sovereignty over its lands. The Property Clause provides “[t]he
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States . . . .”360
Wild horses and burros roam the West. Ranchers abhor them
because they compete with cattle for fodder. New Mexico enacted a
statute allowing the seizure of wild horses and burros, as was the
history in the West. Congress enacted the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act, which protected the animals both on federal
lands and also if they roam onto private lands.361
Burros wandered onto a rancher’s federal grazing lands.362
He notified the New Mexico Livestock Board, which then
rounded up and auctioned off nineteen burros.363 New Mexico
argued the federal government only possessed power to control
the animals if they were moving in interstate commerce or

Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 447 (citing to Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590).
Id. at 448. The legal irony is that the mandatory maximum 55 MPH could easily
have been upheld under the Commerce Clause.
356 Id. at 449.
357 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
358 CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42346, FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1 (2020).
359 45.9% of the land in the contiguous eleven western states is owned by the federal
government while 60.9% of Alaska’s land is federally owned. Id. at 19.
360 U.S. CONST. art. IV., § 3, cl. 2.
361 Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-195, 85 Stat.
649 (1971) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–40). For a critique of the statute, see George
Santini, Comment, Good Intentions Gone “Estray”—The Wild, Free-Roaming Horse and
Burro Act, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 525 (1981).
362 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 533 (1976).
363 Id. at 533–34.
354
355
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damaging the federal lands.364 Otherwise, the federal
government would have to obtain the state’s consent.365
The Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico 366 held
Congress acts as both as a proprietor and as a legislature
pursuant to the Property Clause.367 Congress has “complete
power” over public property “entrusted to it.”368 Significantly,
state and local governments are precluded from regulating the
federal lands absent Congressional consent.369
The effect of Kleppe is that Congress can determine the
development or preservation of 28% of the nation’s land. The
federal government is an owner, operator, proprietor, lessor,
licensor, and regulator. The expansive interpretation of the
Property Clause allows the federal government not only to
regulate things on the federal domain,370 but also activities
passing through the federal domain.371
The Court had previously held Congress has absolute power
under the Property Clause for “particular public property
entrusted to it.”372 The Supreme Court in Kleppe held the
absolute power Congress has over public lands includes the
power to regulate and protect the land’s wildlife.373
The significance of Kleppe is that much of the (rural) west
have different views of the public lands than the federal
government. They view the federal government as an absentee
landlord out of touch with the needs of the people. They want to
develop, drill, mine, log, graze, consume the water, otherwise
utilize the land, and tax the federal lands.374 The use of the
nation’s forests is an ongoing controversy. Should they be seen as
a resource for logging or for recreation? A famous letter from
Bernard DeVoto explains the dichotomy:

364 Id. The federal government arguably then only had the powers to make incidental
rules regarding the use of federal property and to protect federal property. Id. at 536.
365 Id. at 541.
366 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
367 Id. at 540.
368 Id.
369 See id.
370 Motor boats on rivers, snowmobiles in the national parks, or ATV’s and
motorcycles in the desert.
371 See Nat’l Ass’n of Prop. Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Minn.
1980), aff’d, State of Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981) (including motor
boats and snowmobiles in Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness).
372 United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940).
373 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 541.
374 See, e.g., United States v. Nye County Nevada, 938 F.2d 1040, 1041 (9th Cir.
1991).
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You are certainly right when you say that “us natives” can do what
you like with your scenery. But the National Parks and Monuments
happen not to be your scenery. They are our scenery. They do not
belong to Colorado or the West, they belong to the people of the United
States, including the miserable unfortunates who have to live east of
the Allegheny hillocks.375

This viewpoint periodically expressed itself in movements
such as the Sagebrush Rebellion376 or the Catron County
Supremacy Movement.377 These attempts to assert local control
ran afoul of the Property Clause and Kleppe v. New Mexico.
Activities the federal government has regulated, restricted, and
sometimes banned on federal lands include fishing,378 ATV’s, motor
boats,379 canoes,380 dog roaming, cattle grazing,381 prairie dogs on
federal lands,382 beach bonfires,383 houseboats,384 snowmobiles,385 and
pesticides.”386
375 BERNARD DEVOTO, Letter from Bernard DeVoto to the Editor of the Denver Post
(Aug. 1, 1950), in THE LETTERS OF BERNARD DEVOTO 362, 363 (Wallace Stegner ed.,
1975).
376 The Sagebrush Rebellion from the late 1970’s to the early 1980’s unsuccessfully
attempted to force the divestiture of federal lands. A district court rejected Nevada’s claim
that the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) violated Nevada’s 10th
Amendment and the Equal Footing Clause. State of Nevada ex rel. Nev. State Bd. of
Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D. Nev. 1981). In general, see FEDERAL
LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 358, at 19; A. Costandina Titus, The Nevada “Sagebrush
Rebellion” Act: A Question of Constitutionality, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 263, 263 (1981) and
Richard D. Clayton, Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public
Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505, 509.
377 Some counties claimed the federal control of public land was unconstitutional, title
belonged in the states, and the counties could thereby control land use on these lands. See
Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh & Nancy K. Stoner, The County Supremacy Movement, 28 URB.
LAW. 497, 497 (1996).
378 Commercial fishing in Golden Gate National Recreation Area. San Francisco
Herring Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 946 F.3d 564, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2019).
379 See Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Bosworth, 437 F.3d 815, 820
(8th Cir. 2006). The federal government in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness
even applied its restrictions on motor boats and snowmobiles pursuant to the Property
Clause to lands it did not own in the BWCAW. See State of Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d
1240, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981). The case of Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (2016) may seem
contrary, but it interpreted specific statutes applicable to Alaska.
380 See Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass’n of Mo. v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 252, 263 (E.D.
Mo. 1982) (involving commercial renting of canoes within the boundaries of the Ozark
National Scenic Riverways).
381 See Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977, 979 (10th Cir. 1979).
382 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 994 n.4 (10th Cir. 2017).
383 See,
e.g., Ocean Beach Fire Program, NPS.GOV (June 4, 2018),
https://www.nps.gov/goga/learn/management/obfireprogram.htm
[http://perma.cc/9T3XRYBM] (including fore pots and a no-burn season from November 1–February 28/29). As
teenagers and college students, we would go down to Ocean Beach, gather driftwood, and
start a bonfire anywhere on the dry sand any day of the year.
384 See Great Am. Houseboat Co. v. United States, 780 F.2d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 1986)
(involving houseboats on Lake Shasta).
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D. The Takings Clause
The Fifth Amendment, which has been incorporated into the
14th Amendment and thus applicable to the states,387
provides: “No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.”388 A taking is
unconstitutional and thus subject to reasonable compensation,
but a reasonable regulation pursuant to police power is
constitutional.389 A dividing line between a taking and a
reasonable regulation remains unsettled.
A judge, seven decades ago, recognized that attempting
distinctions between a taking and a reasonable exercise of the
police power enmeshes one in a “sophistic Miltonian Serbonian
Bog.”390 In a classic article, Professor Dunham characterized the
cases as a “crazy-quilt pattern.”391
The Supreme Court has not drawn a bright line between a
reasonable exercise of the police power and a taking, admitting it
could not develop a fine line for distinguishing between the
two.392 As stated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York: “[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and
fairness’ require that economic injuries caused by public action
be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”393 Indeed,

385 See e.g., Fund for Animals v. Norton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2005)
(involving snowmobiles in Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks—one of roughly
a score of cases involving Yellowstone and snowmobiles).
386 See United States v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164, 167 (S.D. W.Va. 1986) (spraying of
pesticides to eliminate black flies within the New River Gorge National River).
387 See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 234 (1897).
388 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
389 A workable definition of the police power appears in the venerable case of Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894):
The extent and limits of . . . the ‘police power’ have been a fruitful subject of
discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is
universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safety,
health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary
proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. . . . Beyond
this . . . the state may interfere whereover the public interests demand it, and
in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
390 Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Tex. 1961).
391 Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63, 63.
392 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 149–50 (1978).
393 Id. at 124.
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“The question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable
difficulty.”394
The Court has certainly fulfilled this expectation in a series
of subsequent takings and wetlands cases. Decisions do not
always resolve the issue at hand. Each new Supreme Court
decision initially seems to clarify the issue, but often increases
confusion, complexity, and exceptions to exceptions. Even clear
statements of principles have exceptions.395 The reality is that no
clear definition exists, thus, no clear rules exist.396
A common tool of land use planning is to require developers to
“dedicate” land, facilities, or money to offset the community costs of
the development. The costs could include infrastructure
improvements, schools, police and fire stations, park and recreation
facilities, and even land to be preserved as open space. The question
arises if government goes too far in imposing conditions.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission397 involved the
California Coastal Commission conditioning a permit to tear down an
existing building on a small beachfront lot upon dedication of a public
access, lateral easement along the beach.398 The Supreme Court held
the requirement was unconstitutional; an essential nexus must exist
between the purported goal and the restriction/condition.399 The
Coastal Commission argued the shoreline development would
interfere with visual access to the beach, but the condition of lateral
access was unrelated to this goal.400
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in Dolan v. City of Tigard,401
“We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First
Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the

Id. at 123.
For exception, a physical invasion, no matter how slight, is usually a takings. See
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982); but cf.
Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990). See also Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local
590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (addressing the judicial roller
coaster for shopping center owners); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567–569
(1972); Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 508 (1976); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–83 (1980).
396 One clear rule is that if the public trust doctrine applies, then no takings issue
arises since the property owner is not deprived of a property right.
397 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
398 Id. at 827–29.
399 Id. at 837.
400 Id. at 838.
401 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
394
395

Do Not Delete

50

5/17/2021 8:08 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:1

status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances.”402
Dolan, a plumbing and electric supply wholesaler in Tigard,
Oregon, a town of 30,000, wished to expand his building from
9,700 square feet on 1.67 acres to 17,600 square feet and pave a
39-space parking lot.403 The lot backed up to Fanno Creek, a
floodplain unusable for commercial development.404 The
Municipal Plan for the Central Business District required 15%
for open space and landscaping.405 The city demanded Dolan
dedicate the floodplain and a 15’ strip above it for a
pedestrian/bike path.406 The two dedications would equal 10%
and count towards the 15% open space requirement.407
The Court recognized preventing flooding has a nexus to the
dedication.408 An asphalt parking lot further increases runoff from
an impervious surface. Thus, there was a nexus, a relationship,
between the dedication and the purpose of the restrictions.409
However, the burden rested on the city to show the required
dedication is related in both nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development. The city faced several factual
problems in the case. First, the public greenway was unrelated to
flood control.410 Second, the city would deny the basic property
rights of owners to exclude.411 The city didn’t meet its burden of
proof of showing a reasonable relationship between the trail and
the dedication.412
Nollan held an essential nexus must exist between a
condition the government is seeking to regulate and the
measures implemented that affect public property. Dolan
followed up by imposing a test of rough proportionality, which
does not require precision.413 The standard also needs
individualized determination.414 Some effort must be made to
quantify the findings.415

402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415

Id. at 392.
See id.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 380.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 393.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id.
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For example, the city said the dedications “could” offset, but
that is not equivalent to “will” or “likely to.” The City had not
shown the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips,
generated but the expansion, was reasonably related to the
required dedication.
The Court held the government cannot require a person to
give up a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary
benefit when the property sought has little or no benefit to the
government.416
XI. FEDERALISM: ILLINOIS V. CITY OF MILWAUKEE TRILOGY
Justice Holmes wrote in the 1907 interstate pollution case of
State of Georgia. v. Tennessee Copper Co.:417
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the
air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better
or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered,
should not be further destroyed or threatened by the acts of persons
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not
be endangered from the same source.418

The case became the basis for a federal common law of
interstate pollution.
Environmental Law in the early years was a Tabula Rasa.
Courts wrestled with fundamental questions, one of which was
allocating jurisdiction between federal and state courts. Many
contamination cases involve common law nuisance claims.
In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 419 the Supreme Court
not only held that federal law governs interstate water pollution,
but also that federal common law could resolve the dispute.
Justice Douglas wrote, “When we deal with air and water in their
ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common
law[.] . . .”420 The decision had the potential to open up the federal
court houses to a flood of nuisance suits.
However, the Court held nine years later in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II) that federal common law is
displaced when Congress speaks directly on the matter; then it
Id. at 396.
206 U.S. 230 (1907).
418 Id. at 238.
419 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972). Illinois sued four Wisconsin cities and two sewerage
commissions for discharging sewage in lake Michigan. See also Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
420 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
416
417
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occupies the field.421 The opinion left open the question of
whether state common law could apply.422 The Court
subsequently held the law of the source state would apply to an
interstate water pollution case, but the case could be brought in
the state where the harm occurred.423
The City of Milwaukee decision was the predecessor 30 years
later to American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut. 424
Several states, New York City and three private land trusts sued
the federal Tennessee Valley Authority and four private utilities
for emitting carbon dioxide from their fossil fuel plants.425 Carbon
dioxide is a greenhouse gas. The large atmospheric emissions of
carbon dioxide contributed to global warming. Plaintiffs sought
abatement.426 The Clean Air Act and EPA actions were sufficient
under the City of Milwaukee rule to displace federal jurisdiction
on a federal common law public nuisance theory. The door is left
open under diversity jurisdiction for a private public nuisance
lawsuit in federal court.427
The practical effect of the Illinois v. Milwaukee litigation is
that the federal courts are closed to state common law or
statutory pollution lawsuits absent a federal violation or
complete diversity of citizenship.
XII. CONCLUSION
We never really know at the unveiling of a new discipline or
revolution where it will lead. Will Environmental Law just be, as
the 1978 appellants argued in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
“outwardly cloaked in the currently fashionable garb of
environmental protection[?]”428 Or, would Environmental Law
become a compelling, or even determinative, component of public
policy? A half-century allows us a look-back to study its
evolution.
The ethos has changed: Storm King Mountain, Tellico Dam,
Overton Park and the Cross Florida Barge Canal mark the end of
the post-World War II infrastructure era as well as 360 years of

See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 310–11 (1981).
See id. at 340.
See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987).
424 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
425 Id. at 415.
426 Id. at 424.
427 See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2020) (pending in the
federal courts including private common law nuisance and public trust claims in addition
to constitutional claims).
428 437 U.S. 617, 625–26 (1978).
421
422
423
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America’s emphasis on development to the transition to the Age
of the Environment. The full realization of the change in
paradigms wasn’t immediately realized. These formative battles
are, at best, footnotes and perhaps a few perfunctory citations, to
today’s students and young practitioners. My generation is fast
disappearing from environmental law. I have tried over the past
decade to paint a picture of the beginnings and thus its legacy.
America’s environment has substantially improved over the past
half century. The air and waters are cleaner.429 The Great Lakes are
clean. The Rogue River is again naturally beautiful as it flows
through Oregon. The Cuyahoga River no longer catches on fire as it
flows through Cleveland. The western forests are still standing.
The fabric of environmental law developed in the early days.
Many of the cases may seem prosaic, taken for granted,430 but were
considered revolutionary at the time, such as with the more recent
Massachusetts v. EPA. Today’s litigation remains dependent on
standing, reviewability, and administrative discretion.
Some early developments, such as NEPA and the Endangered
Species Act, quickly grew from “sleeper statutes” into broad statutes
cutting across the environmental spectrum. NEPA became a global
model. The significance of cases, such as Sierra Club v. Morton, was
quickly recognized. A few cases established both legal precedence
and resolved environmental issues.
Environmental protection is an on-going challenge. Old
problems may be resolved. New problems will always emerge.
Pollution, even under permits, will contaminate the air and
water. Recycling remains a practical issue because of economics.
Environmental Law is dynamic. It overlapped from the
beginning
Land
Use
Planning,
Administrative
Law,
Constitutional Law, Energy Law, Property Law and Torts like
Venn Diagrams. It is as amazing today as 50 years ago. It is
always changing and expanding as the environmental problems
evolve and new ones emerge, such as Climate Change,
Environmental Justice, and plastics.
However, the pillars supporting Environmental Law remain
solid. Even when an environmental problem, such as hydraulic
mining, is seemingly resolved over a century ago, the legacy

429 As an asthmatic I could not have lived in Orange County during the 1960’s or
1970’s, but do so today as part of the greater Los Angeles Plain.
430 A look at the three Ruhl-Salzman environmental surveys discussed in footnotes
16–17 show a consistent movement to newer cases except for four cases from four to five
decades ago.
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continues as with the abandoned mines in Colorado. Air and
water pollution, and toxic hazards will persist. The parameters of
controlling them were established in the early days of the
Environmental Era.
The answer to the first set of questions is oblivious.
Environmental Law is a critical component of public policy
decision making.
Environmental Law seems rock-hard today. Yet, the
questions I ask today are: 1) Is Environmental Law now firmly
engrained into critical public policy decisions; or 2) Has it
reached its apogee?
The Environmental Age is entering its sixth decade. A
reaction is highly foreseeable at some point. The Trump
Administration has reversed several existing policies431 and is
seeking to revise the CEQ guidelines on NEPA statements. 432
These changes will run through a gauntlet of litigation with
uncertain results.
I think of my 2013 conclusion in Looking Back to the Future: The
Curmudgeon’s Guide to the Future of Environmental Law: “The
changes have been dramatic, but it is unwise to ignore the polices,
statutes, and mores of the preceding 360 years as they continue to
define much of our future, particularly in times of economic adversity
and resource scarcities, such as energy. To the extent that
environmental protection does not provide our basic needs, it may fail
economic and political reality.”433

431 For a list of the changes, see Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra
Pierre-Louis, The Trump Administration Is Reversing More Than 100 Environmental
Rules.
Here’s
the
Full
List,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
10,
2020),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environmentrollbacks.html?searchResultPosition=1 [http://perma.cc/K5M6-CKSE].
432 A discussion of the proposed NEPA changes is found at: James M. McElfish, Jr.,
What Did CEQ Do?, ELI (Sept. 14, 2020), http://www.eli.org/vibrant-environmentblog/what-did-ceq-do [http://perma.cc/5K8Z-F36U].
433 Denis Binder, Looking Back to the Future: The Curmudgeon’s Guide to the Future
of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 993, 1016 (2013).

